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From the dawn of civilization, the ever-growing sophistication of human
society, division of labour, specialization, and comparative advantage rendered
trade an indispensable part of any human enterprise. The need for trade begets
the need for finance, and as trade becomes globally indispensable, so does
finance. Indeed, trade and finance midwifed the birth of globalization, foster-
mothered its infancy, and nurtured it into its prime age. Although globalization
has seen ebbs and flows and has faced numerous disruptions by its enemies, in
the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC), it was not the globalization’s
discontents but the masters of trade and finance who were about to push
globalization off the precipice. To understand why globalization suffered a blow
by its friends rather than its foes, the book successfully attempts to promote a
better understanding of the workings of global finance, to unearth covert fault
lines in its crust, to highlight serious flaws in its governance and regulation, and
to propose remedies for the deficiencies in the governance and regulation of the
global financial system. This is made possible by highlighting the gap between
virtually seamlessly-globalized finance and its fragmented, unsystematic,
inconsistent, and incomplete regulation and governance.
2. SUMMARY OF THE BOOK
Excluding introduction and conclusion, the book1 is a collection of 20 essays
and consists of five sections, each of which accommodates three to four different
articles related to the overarching theme of the section. Having elaborated the
changing nature of banking and the meaning of the term ‘‘global” in the term
‘‘global finance and regulation” in the introduction, the first section, entitled
‘‘Global Financial Architecture : Evolution, Shortcomings, and
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Interdependence”, focuses on the architecture of the global financial regulation.
After studying the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and its role in the future of
financial regulation, this section ventures into identifying certain overlooked
regulatory networks in the global finance by highlighting the accomplishments of
networks constituting the periphery rather than the core of the global financial
regulation. This section closes by studying the application of the Basel III in
China from a political economy perspective.
The second section, entitled ‘‘The Changing Face Of Central Banking”,
studies central banking and its increasing involvement in financial supervision,
and the implications that the supervisory role of central banks would have for
central-bank independence and the conduct of monetary policy. The book goes
on to study ‘‘the quandary of macroprudential regulation” and argues for a
systematic approach to financial regulation, which should be coherent,
consistent, and capable of replacing ad-hoc regulation by systematic
regulation. Furthermore, inspired by the legal theory of finance,2 the role of
law in creating ‘‘safe assets” is analyzed by focusing on four major examples of
such assets: government debt, bank debt, repurchase agreements (repos),3 and
asset-backed securities.
In the third section, the focus shifts to ‘‘Reconceptualising Cross-Border
Finance”, in which competition of the financial centers for Renminbi-related
businesses in the context of the Chinese government’s intent to internationalize
Renminbi is reviewed. Then, issues of market-design are analyzed by focusing on
the concept of social efficiency versus ‘‘mercenary efficiency” in analyzing how
market participants are likely to intervene in the process of design of the financial
infrastructure to their own benefit. Thereafter, the evolution of bank secrecy and
its erosion in a globalized financial world is examined. This section ends with an
analysis of the liability for transnational securities fraud by focusing on the
exclusionary effects of Morrison v. National Australia Bank4 in the context of
cross listings and in light of the ‘‘avoidance” versus ‘‘legal bonding” hypothesis.
The fourth section is entitled ‘‘Addressing Too-Big-To-Fail and Shadow
Banking”. The first article studies the arguments for and against the social utility
2 Katharina Pistor, “A Legal Theory of Finance” (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative
Economics 311 [Pistor].
3 A repo or repurchase agreement is the sale of securities coupled with a commitment to
repurchase them at a specified price and at a future date or on demand. See Tobias
Adrian, et al., “Repo and Securities Lending” (2012) International Capital Market
Association (ICMA) NBER Working Paper 18549, online: <http://www.icmagrou-
p.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/repo-and-collateral-markets/frequent-
ly-asked-questions-on-repo/>. In the recent financial crisis, the run on repo markets,
especially the repos collateralized by commercial paper, which led to forced deleveraging
arguably played a role in theGFC. SeeGary B.Gorton&AndrewMetrick, “Securitized
Banking and the Run on Repo” (2012) 104 Journal of Financial Economics 425; Gary B.
Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010).
4 Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010).
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and disutility of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks. By reviewing the industrial
organization literature and empirical findings, the article then examines the
validity of the arguments based on economies of scale and scope in the banking
sector, and the impact of the TBTF subsidy on competition and systemic stability
in the banking industry. It also offers a concise but informative review of
banking structural reforms, and concludes by critically opining on narrow
banking proposals. The second article proposes a single enforcement handbook
on top of the single supervisory mechanism and the single rulebook in the EU
context. This section concludes by case studies of the shadow banking sector in
China, highlighting the differences in the evolution and the role of shadow
banking in Chinese economy, and spotting mismatches in Chinese regulatory
architecture and the underlying markets it regulates.
The fifth section studies ‘‘The Role of Culture and Ethics in Global Finance”
by first focusing on the emerging Asian model of promoting capital-market
professionalism. The section then turns to the role of the equivalence
requirement in the context of financial and tax law and its impact on the
competitiveness of financial centers, emphasizing that the equivalence principle is
likely to increase the competitiveness of financial centers. The next paper studies
human-rights due diligence as a new policy in financial institutions. Then, the
role of standards in supporting financial regulation is reviewed by taking stock of
the role of standards in injecting ethics into finance and financial regulation. The
book ends with concluding remarks by the editors, that sum up and highlight the
main findings of each paper.
3. COMMENTARY
The most outstanding contribution of the book to the literature on the global
financial regulation is particularly manifested in shedding light on the most
recent regulations and institutional developments introduced after the GFC, that
have significant implications for the governance and regulation of global finance.
Its focus on many different aspects of regulation of global finance,
underexplored institutions and organizations, and their contribution to the
deepening of the globalization of the financial markets make its intuitions,
insights and contributions to the literature on the international financial
regulation unique and indisputable. These insights are particularly pronounced
where the book highlights the role of law in giving shape to safe assets, the role of
market participants in shaping financial infrastructure, and the role of often-
overlooked, little-known, and underexplored global financial regulatory
networks in regulating global finance, the evolution of central banking, its
increasing role in prudential supervision and its impact on central-bank
independence in monetary policy, and last but not least, the role of legal
instruments such as the equivalence requirement in increasing the
competitiveness among financial centers.
As the book discusses topical issues of global finance, it brings together
contributions from renowned scholars from North America, Europe, South-East
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Asia and Australia. Since the focus of the book is on the major global financial
centers and trends, the absence of contributions from the rest of the world may
be excused. However, one of the structural shortcomings of the book is in the
absence of a coherent storyline that can put all contributions together and give
them a general direction. Indeed, a bird’s eye view of the table of contents reveals
a general lack of cohesion, as do the disharmonized footnotes and citations
styles.
From the range of substantive issues discussed in the book, this essay
provides a critical evaluation of three central propositions, which cut across
several articles and constitute a recurring theme of the book. First, it discusses
whether global finance necessitates global regulation and governance. Second, it
turns to the question of whether the regulatory regime changes in the aftermath
of the GFC have gone far enough to address the potential problems in the global
financial system. Third, it will provide a critical evaluation of the approach taken
in the book to the role of culture, professionalism and ethics in global finance.
Finally, this commentary highlights some overlooked aspects and pressing issues
of global finance regulation, which could have been included in the book, and the
book’s ambivalence regarding some different and sometimes opposing
viewpoints about certain unsettled issues raised by contributors to the volume.
(a) Does Global Finance Need Global Regulation and Governance?
One of the central ideas of the book is the pronounced emphasis on the need
for a global governance or regulation. Highlighting the emergence of a new
order, which is becoming ‘‘hierarchical, procedurally regular, and politically
supervised”,5 emphasizing the misguided trend towards financial liberalization,6
viewing regulatory arbitrage as a potentially harmful and sinister phenomenon,7
along with raising concerns about issues of market fragmentation and
deglobalization because of divergent policy choices throughout the world (e.g.
the Volcker Rule and ring fencing),8 and underlining the gap between global
regulatory institutions and ‘‘truly global finance”,9 the book puts forward new
policy recommendations in favour of harmonization, centralization and
consolidation of regulatory regimes. These policy recommendations include,
inter alia, completing a single European rulebook and a single supervisory
handbook with a ‘‘single enforcement handbook”,10 centralizing equivalence
5 David Zaring, “Financial Regulations’ Overlooked Networks” in Buckley et al., supra
note 1 at 70.
6 Emilios Avgouleas, “Large Systemic Banks and Fractional Reserve Banking: Intract-
able Dilemmas in Search of Effective Solutions” in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 282.
7 DouglasW.Arner &MichaelW. Taylor, “The Financial Stability Board and the Future
of International Financial Regulation” in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 64-65 [Arner &
Taylor].
8 Ibid. at 64.
9 Lawrence G. Baxter, “Understanding the Global in Global Finance and Regulation” in
Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 29.
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assessment at the EU level,11 and hardening of the soft laws in financial
regulation.12 In line with this agenda, the book seems to be unequivocal in
suggesting that a global financial system lacking a global regulator, a global
lender of last resort, or a global sovereign-bankruptcy regime will lead to another
major financial crisis.13
The general underlying reason for these policy proposals seems to be the fact
that since finance is global, financial regulation should be global too; in other
words, ‘‘the domain of the regulator should be the same as the domain of the
financial market.”14 However, despite the melody of this argument, the latter
may not necessarily flow from the former, i.e., global finance might not
necessitate global financial regulation.15 One could even argue that global
financial markets would be as prone to financial crises in the presence of such
global institutions and regulation as they would be in their absence. One might
even take a step forward and assert that global financial crises would occur not
only despite the existence of such global regulatory institutions, but perhaps
because of them.
Although the book goes as far as proposing far-fetched human-rights policy
recommendations as lessons of the GFC,16 perhaps mitigation of systemic risks
and safeguarding the financial stability as a global public good17 are the best
10 Dalvinder Singh & James Hodges, “Turning the Tide? How European Banking and
Financial Services Legislation areMakingWaves on theEnforcement Front” inBuckley
et al., supra note 1 at 322.
11 Dirk A. Zetzsche, “Competitiveness of Financial Centers in Light of Financial and Tax
Law Equivalence Requirements” in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 414.
12 Arner & Taylor, supra note 7.
13 Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 5.
14 Kern Alexander et al., Global Governance of Financial Systems: The International
Regulation of Systemic Risk (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2006) at 15 [Alexander et
al.]. For a similar argument, see Rosa M. Lastra, “Do We Need a World Financial
Organization?” (2014) 17 Journal of International Economic Law 787. See also Dirk
Schoenmaker, Governance of International Banking: The Financial Trilemma (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 90 [Schoenmaker]. Schoenmaker particularly
advocates a move away from soft-law approach to a hard-law approach, particularly
for the purposes of making international cooperation effective in times of crisis, at 148.
See also 151, where Shoenmaker asserts that ‘‘Global banks need global institutions.”
15 Markus Brunnermeier et al., ‘‘The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation:
Geneva Report on the World Economy” (ICMB 2009) at xviii.
16 Alex A.Weber, “Human Rights Due Diligence as New Policy in Financial Institutions”
in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 441. Indeed, a hodgepodge of policy recommendations,
which is advocated by reference to the financial crisis, has given birth to a new logical
fallacy entitled “Argumentum a Crise”. See Luca Enriques & Martin Bengtzen, “The
‘Argumentum a Crise’: So Powerful, So Prone to Misuse” (8 June 2016) University of
Oxford, Faculty of Law, Business Law (blog), online: <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/
business-law-blog/blog/2016/06/argumentum-crise-so-powerful-so-prone-misuse>.
17 Charles Wyplosz, ‘‘Financial Stability as a Global Public Good” and Carles Wyplosz
‘‘International Financial Instability” in Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marc A.
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arguments that could be put forward for regulatory globalization in finance.18 In
addition to the deficiencies and design flaws in financial market infrastructure,
financial crises often correlate with the size and concentration of the financial
institutions and markets,19 extraordinarily high levels of leverage, liquidity
mismatches,20 interconnectedness among financial institutions,21 and herd
behaviour.22 It seems that on nearly all these grounds, a move towards
centralized regulation at the global level could amplify, rather than mitigate, the
risks of financial crises. For the sake of brevity, this commentary only briefly
discusses two unintended consequences of regulatory harmonization (i.e. their
impact on homogeneity, and interconnectedness and herd behaviour).
A move towards regulatory harmonization (or regulatory monopoly or
cartelization)23 could be misguided,24 because it could diminish diversity in the
Stern, eds., Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
18 Alexander et al., supra note 14 at 23-26. Another interesting argument in favor of more
harmonization and consolidation at the global level is the idea of financial trilemma
which states that only two of the three objectives of having (1) a stable financial system,
(2) international banking, and (3) national financial policies for supervision and
resolution can be combined, but not all three. Arguing that the international supervisory
cooperation should be analyzed in tandem with resolution regimes. See Schoenmaker,
supra note 14 at 607.
19 Not surprisingly, market concentration has continued to rise in major financial centers
since the financial crisis, not despite but perhaps because of post-crisis regulatory
interventions. For a study providing evidence of increasing market concentration in the
EU, see European Central Bank, ‘‘Report on Financial Structures“ (October 2015),
online: <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/reportonfinancialstructure-
s201510.en.pdf>.
20 Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, “Liquidity and Leverage” (2010) 19 Journal of
Financial Intermediation 418.
21 For an illustration of such interconnectedness, see Darrell Duffie, “The Failure
Mechanics of Dealer Banks” (2010) 24 Journal of Economic Perspectives 51.
22 Herding occurs when financial institutions mimic other financial institutions while their
own private information or proprietary models suggest different strategies. See
ChristopherAvery&Peter Zemsky, “MultidimensionalUncertainty andHerdBehavior
in Financial Markets” (1998) 88 American Economic Review 724.
The less diverse a financial market, the more likely it is that the market participants
act in unison and amplify positive feedback loops. Jean-Pierre Zigrand, et al.,
“Financial Stability and Computer Based Trading” in Foresight: The Future of
Computer Trading in Financial Markets (2012) Final Project Report, The Government
Office for Science, London at 17.
23 Jonathan R. Macey, “Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory
Competition” (2003) 52 Emory LJ 1353.
24 Roberta Romano, “Against Financial RegulationHarmonization: A Comment” (2010)
Yale Law & Economics Working Paper No. 414 [Romano]. She sees the post-crisis
regulatory response to hedge funds in light of the historical pattern of hostility to short-
sellers. Romano offers her argument in the context of hedge fund regulation, her
584 BANKING & FINANCE LAW REVIEW [32 B.F.L.R.]
financial sector, which can lead to lower levels of competition among different
institutional forms, and business and earning models.25 In other words,
establishing a global financial regulatory authority or a global governance
regime for financial markets through regulatory harmonization or consolidation
may contribute to heightened systemic risk, because in a regime of global
harmonization, regulators tend to adopt similar regulatory strategies and
perhaps unintentionally encourage homogeneity and correlated financial
strategies. Depriving financial markets of the benefits of diversity and
heterogeneity, a harmonized regulatory regime, which also amplifies the
potential impact of regulatory errors, could be more prone to systemic crises
than its decentralized regulatory counterpart. For example, if harmonization
results in homogeneity, it is more likely that, in times of distress, liquidity would
dry up for the lack of contrarian position takers in the financial markets.26
On the other hand, regulatory arbitrage, which is perceived as a rather
sinister phenomenon in the book, can mitigate the adverse impact of distortions
and lead to positive welfare benefits in financial markets if regulation itself is
inefficient and possibly designed to serve the interests of incumbents.27
Therefore, it is impossible to know ex ante whether regulatory arbitrage is a
boon or bane. However, turning a blind eye to the positive aspects of regulatory
arbitrage and regulatory competition, as buffers against systemic regulatory and
market failures,28 and only highlighting their negative consequences in order to
argument is based on the grounds that hedge fundswere neither the cause of the financial
crisis, nor is it likely that they will cause one in the future.
25 D.T. Llewellyn, “A Perspective from the UK” in R. Ayadi & R. Schmidt, eds.,
Investigating Diversity in the Banking Sector in Europe: The Performance and Role of
Savings Banks (Centre for European Policy Studies, 2009).
26 As an example, studies suggest that the leverage of hedge funds is countercyclical to the
leverage of mainstream financial institutions. This means that when other financial
market participants deleverage, hedge funds lever up, and vice versa. This counter-
cyclical leverage of hedge funds compared to that of mainstream financial institutions is
healthy for the financial system as a whole, because it can smooth the effects of financial
crises. See Andrew Ang, et al., “Hedge Fund Leverage” (2011) 102 Journal of Financial
Economics 102. If regulatory harmonization comes at the cost of lower levels of diversity
among financial institutions, it is highly likely that it would eliminate contrarian position
takers in distressed financialmarkets and thereby amplify the impact of financial distress
in financial markets.
See also Hossein Nabilou, “Regulatory Arbitrage and Hedge Fund Regulation: A
Need for a Transnational Response?” 22 Fordham J. of Corp. and Fin. L.
[forthcoming in 2017]. (Explaining how regulatory arbitrage can increase market or
downward accountability of regulators by increasing regulatory competition).
27 Luigi Zingales, “Does Finance Benefit Society?” (2015) NBERWorking Paper Series at
21.
28 Romano, supra note 24. Empirical evidence tends to confirm the intuition that effective
corporate and securities laws are the product of regulatory competition or competitive
legal systems, embracing bottom-up legal innovations and experimentation, rather than
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make an argument for further harmonization and consolidation is unlikely to
lead to welfare-enhancing policy interventions.
Second, in addition to intensifying the asymmetric distributional effects of
international financial regulation,29 unifying financial laws at the global level and
bringing several markets under a single regulatory umbrella may contribute to
higher levels of interconnectedness and herd behaviour, this time not at a local
but at a global level, by encouraging homogeneity in financial institutions and
correlated financial positions and strategies.30 Whereas a more localized and
diversified financial regulatory design, which takes into account the different
preferences of often dissimilar jurisdictions,31 within which there is a healthy
level of regulatory arbitrage and competition, would minimize the impact of
regulatory errors. The risk-based capital adequacy requirements (CARs) of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), as a de facto soft-law global
the top-down approach by the regulators who are detached from the day-to-day
operations of financial firms. See Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance” (2005) 114 Yale LJ 1521 at 1529. A third view
of the unitary vs. diversified regulatory systems — called ‘‘regulatory co-opetition” —
sides with the approach that “optimal governance requires a flexible mix of competition
and cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between governmental and
non-governmental actors”. See Damien Geradin & Joseph A. McCahery, “Regulatory
Co-opetition: Transcending the Regulatory Competition Debate” in Jacint Jordana &
David Levi-Faur, eds., The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms
for the Age of Governance (Cheltenham,UK: Edward Elgar, 2004) at 93.It is noteworthy
to highlight that regulatory competition models have their own limits. See Lucian
Bebchuk, et al., “Does theEvidenceFavor StateCompetition inCorporateLaw?” (2002)
90CaliforniaL.Rev. 1775. (Arguing that aside from the fact that regulatory competition
may serve the managers of a company rather than its shareholders, it may create
externalities too. In other words, regulatory competition might be beneficial for
managers or shareholders of a firm, but it might not be so for the society at large.)
29 Chris Brummer, “Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance — and Not Trade”
(2010) 13 Journal of International Economic Law 623.
30 See IMF, ‘‘Global Financial Stability Report: Potent Policies for a Successful
Normalization“ (April 2016). (Highlighting the positive relationship between financial
market integrationand increase in spillovers across countrieswhich ismorepredominant
between countries with similar micro-financial fundamentals.) Mario Giovanoli, ”The
Reform of the International Financial Architecture after the Global Crisis“ (2009) 42
New York University Journal of International Law and Politcs 81 at 87-88. (Briefly
summarizing the unintended side effects of international financial standards and their
contribution to the global financial crisis.)
31 Lucia Quaglia, “The Sources of European Union Influence in International Financial
Regulatory Fora” (2014) 21 Journal of European Public Policy 327. (Highlighting the
different preferences of the U.S. and the EU in influencing the international regulatory
fora and using the preference attainment as the indicator of the EU influence in shaping
international regulatory standards. Furthermore, by highlighting the differences in
banking systems within the EU (theUK, France andGermany) she finds that the lack of
cohesiveness in the preferences in the EU contributed to the lack of cohesive position on
Basel III and therefore, in formulating the Basel III standards, Europe had a relatively
lower influence despite its big market size and its regulatory capacity.)
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banking regulator, is a case in point. More localized approaches on CARs are
advocated, because certain institutional and regional factors that might lead to
variations in the optimal levels of capital and loss-absorbing capacity across
jurisdictions should be taken into account in imposing capital requirements.32 In
the same vein, the appropriate levels of capital requirements might vary as
between the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries and non-OECD countries.33 In addition, the CARs were
initially adopted to enhance the safety and soundness of individual banks. But in
the meantime, they proved to be procyclical,34 because of their implicit
requirement that banks should increase their capital when the risks of their
portfolio rise. Therefore, in distressed markets, the financial institutions facing
leverage constraints are likely to deleverage with the possibility of causing fire-
sales and downward spirals in asset prices,35 thereby limiting the supply of credit
and contributing to financial instability.36
In addition to CARs’ impact on creating similar risk measurement and risk-
mitigation techniques, which led to homogenization of income streams of
different business divisions and encouraged procyclicality, capital regulation at
the global level had one more hidden aspect. By providing opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage, it also produced a symmetric gaming behaviour by big
banks to minimize their levels of regulatory capital.37 In other words, not only
did the Basel standards homogenize financial strategies designed to comply with
such standards, but also these standards homogenized the strategies designed to
circumvent them.
The second example relates to the recent banking structural reforms adopted
on both sides of the Atlantic in the wake of the GFC.38 The literature on banking
structures suggests that in addition to scope economies, there are diversification
and stabilization benefits in combining commercial banking and investment
banking businesses.39 In addition, there is also evidence in favour of resilience of
32 JihadDagher, et al., ‘‘Benefits and Costs of Bank Capital”, IMF Staff DiscussionNotes
(March 2016) at 4.
33 Ibid.
34 Henrik Andersen, “Procyclical Implications of Basel II: Can the Cyclicality of Capital
Requirements be Contained?” (2011) 7 Journal of Financial Stability 138.
35 Andrei Shleifer&RobertW.Vishny, “LiquidationValues andDebtCapacity:AMarket
Equilibrium Approach” (1992) 47 Journal of Finance 1343.
36 The new countercyclical buffers are adopted to address such problems.
37 Emilios Avgouleas, “Large Systemic Banks and Fractional Reserve Banking: Intract-
able Dilemmas in Search of Effective Solutions” in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 389.
38 Generally speaking, these reforms are to limit the universal banking model by setting
some restrictions along the line with the commercial and investment banking business
models often by prohibiting proprietary trading and investment in private funds by the
banking entities.
39 Bernard Shull & Lawrence J. White, “The Right Corporate Structure for Expanded
Bank Activities” (1998) 115 Banking LJ 446 at 464.
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universal banks to systemic shocks vis-a`-vis commercial banking and investment
banking conducted separately.40 Nevertheless, to the extent strategies follow
structures, banking structural reforms would amplify homogeneity of structures
and strategies in the banking industry by narrowing down the scope of activities
of banking entities. Hence, it would be more likely that similar institutions may
face difficulties at the same time. This would increase the likelihood of herd
behaviour which in itself would give rise to the problem of too-many-to-fail,41
making financial institutions systemic as a group. In their current forms, there
are considerable differences among banking structural reforms in major financial
centers around the world,42 however, under a scenario in which the edicts to
restructure banking entities and activities would come from a centralized global
regulator, there would be considerable risks of amplified homogeneity and
uniformity, contributing to higher levels of systemic risk. Indeed, it is likely that
more and more centralization at the global level would throw the already dismal
state of systemic risk regulation in financial markets and institutions out of the
frying pan into the fire.
Empirical evidence suggests that over the past few decades, similarity or
homogeneity between financial institutions has increased.43 This trend is more
prevalent among larger financial institutions. This similarity indeed manifested
itself in the same market (globally), similar activities, similar risk management
techniques and similar trading strategies which can amplify the effects of
systemic risks. In addition, the sources of funding in the banking sector has
converged. This has led to increasing reliance of the banking sector on the same
sources of funding. Overall, increasing homogeneity and correlated strategies in
financial markets, and potential for herd behaviour highlight the dark side of a
move towards global governance and regulatory cartelization and their impact
on the increased likelihood of financial crises at the global level.44
40 CharlesCalomiris, “TheCosts ofRejectingUniversal Banking:AmericanFinance in the
German Mirror, 1870-1914” in Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Daniel M. G. Raff, eds.,
Coordiation and Information: Historical Perspectives on the Organization of Enterprise
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
41 Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, “Too Many to Fail—An Analysis of Time-
Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies” (2007) 16 Journal of Financial Intermediation 1.
42 Matthias Lehmann, “Volcker Rule, Ring-Fencing or Separation of Bank Activities-
Comparison of Structural Reform Acts Around the World” LSE Law, Society and
Economy Working Papers 25/2014.
43 Charles A.E. Goodhart & Wolf Wagner, “Regulators should encourage more diversity
in the financial system” (12 April 2012) VOX EU, online: <http://voxeu.org/article/
regulators-should-encourage-more-diversity-financial-system>.
44 See for example Mads Andenas & Iris HY Chiu, “Financial Stability and Legal
Integration in Financial regulation” (2013) 38 European L. Rev. 335. (Putting forward
similar arguments in the context of the European Union and discussing how the
emphasis on legal integration can compromise financial stability objectives by over-
looking local needs.)
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Despite the general trend of the book towards global regulation and
governance, the forces of localization come into picture later in the book. The
articles discussing the Chinese markets highlight the idiosyncrasies of the
problems of the Chinese shadow banking system.45 The emphasis on China’s
uniqueness in defining shadow banking46 and the acknowledgment of the fact
that ‘‘global financial crisis affected different parts of the world in different
ways”,47 along with the concerns about regional effects of global reforms,48
soften the book’s tone and makes it more ambivalent in its push toward
globalized financial regulation and governance.
(b) Has Financial Regulation Gone Far Enough?
Another recurring theme in the book is that the financial reforms adopted in
the aftermath of the GFC have not gone far enough.49 Opining on the depth and
breadth of the post-crisis financial reforms requires identifying the socially
optimal level of financial regulation in each sector, which can be a daunting task
if not an impossible one. However, the claim that the post-crisis financial
regulatory reforms have not gone far enough does not seem plausible in the face
of sweeping regulatory reforms, which resulted in major overhaul of the
regulatory environment of the global financial markets.50 Shortly after the
45 RobinHuiHuang, “ShadowBanking and ItsRegulation:TheCase ofChina” inBuckley
et al., supra note 1 at 348 [Huang]. It appears that China is not unique in its shadow
banking being different from the rest of theWestern economies. In neighboring India, it
is also found that unlike Western economies where the growth of the shadow banking
sector is driven by a desire to mitigate counterparty risks by providing ‘‘safe” collateral
for financial transactions, or for the purposes of regulatory arbitrage, the shadow
banking sector is a substitute for direct lending by banks in non-urban India. SeeViral V.
Acharya, et al., “The growth of a shadowbanking system in emergingmarkets: Evidence
from India” (2013) 39 Journal of InternationalMoney and Finance 207; Viral V.Acharya,
et al., “SecuritizationWithout Risk Transfer” (2013) 107 Journal of Financial Economics
515. (They find that securitization vehicles are mainly motivated by and used for
regulatory arbitrage.)
46 Yingmao Tang, “Shadow Banking or ’Bank’s Shadow’: Reconceptualising Global
Shadow Banking Regulation” in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 329, 337-338 [Tang].
47 William Blair, “Reconceptualizing the Role of Standards in Supporting Financial
Regulation” in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 445 [Blair].
48 Ibid. at 446.
49 Ibid. at 5.
50 The Dodd-Frank Act amounts to 845 pages, 16 titles, 225 new rules involving 11
agencies. See Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, “Implications of the Dodd-
Frank Act” (2012) 4 Annual Review of Financial Economics at 2. It is estimated that the
Act will result in approximately 400 rules and 87 studies before its full implementation.
Davis Polk, “Dodd-Frank Rulemaking Progress Report: Progress as of June 1, 2011”
online: <https://www.davispolk.com/files/uploads/Dodd-Frank%20documents/
Dodd-Frank.ProgressReport.jun11.pdf>. So far, a majority of regulations have been
proposed and passed. See Davis Polk, “Dodd-Frank Progress Report: October 2013”
online: <https://www.google.ca/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&esp-
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financial crisis, the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act51 was passed. The range of financial
activities it regulates is staggering.52 In addition, European financial markets
underwent similar transformations.53 The European Commission proposed a
dozen new rules for reforming the regulation, supervision, and governance of
financial institutions at the EU level, which to date entirely transformed the
landscape of EU financial regulation. Moreover, with the active role of
international forums such as the Group of Twenty (G20), the rise of
additional soft-law institutions such as the Financial Stability Board (FSB),
increasingly active role played by the BCBS, and the transfiguration of
transnational financial regulatory networks, we have witnessed similar
movements at the global level.
Save a few papers, the book seems to underestimate these reforms and their
potential promises. Although there still is ample room for concern about the
financial instability in the post-crisis financial reform era,54 such concerns should
not underestimate the depth of the post-crisis-financial-reform agenda. More
importantly, at a stage where sufficient data is not available to ascertain the
v=2&ie=UTF-8#q=See+Davis+Polk+Regulatory+Tracker,+Dodd-Frank+-
Progress+Report:+October+2013+(2013).&*>.
51 TheU.S. ‘‘Dodd-FrankAct” was signed into law on July 21, 2010. SeeDodd-FrankWall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173.
52 The most important changes involve, inter alia, identifying and regulating systemic risk
by assigning the responsibility of designating firms as Systemically Important Nonbank
Financial Companies (SINBFCs) to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC),
establishing the Office of Financial Research (OFR) for measuring and providing tools
for the measurement of systemic risk, and expanding the regulatory authority of the
Federal Reserve (Fed) over systemic institutions, authorizing prompt corrective action
through the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) administered by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), introducing the Volcker Rule, regulating derivatives
markets, and establishing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), regulat-
ingmortgage lending practices, private funds (e.g. hedge funds and private equity funds),
rating agencies, and securitization.
53 See Peter Praet & Gre´gory Nguyen, “Overview of Recent Policy Initiatives in Response
to the Crisis” (2008) 4 Journal of Financial Stability 368; Charles A. E. Goodhart, “The
Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis” (2008) 4 Journal of Financial Stability 351.
54 Some of the unaddressed or partially addressed issues by the post-crisis financial
reforms, which can potentially contribute to financial instability, are highlighted in
Duffie’s discussion of failure mechanism of large and systemically important dealer
banks. See Darrell Duffie, “The Failure Mechanics of Dealer Banks” (2010) 24 The
Journal of Economic Perspectives 51 at 68-70. Skeel also discusses further shortcomings
in the insolvency regimes not only prior to the financial crisis, but also in the regime
established after the financial reforms driven by the financial crisis. SeeDavid Skeel, The
New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended)
Consequences (Hoboken, NJ: JohnWiley & Sons, 2011). However, some of the financial
stability concerns may originate from the very post-crisis financial regulatory reforms
such as the increased importance of financing through the shadow banking sector. See
Hossein Nabilou & Alessio Pacces, “The Law and Economics of Shadow Banking” in
Iris H. Chiu, ed., Research Handbook in Shadow Banking [forthcoming in 2017].
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impact of these regulatory reforms — some of which are yet to be implemented55
— such sweeping statements appear to be somewhat premature. Since
ascertaining whether these reforms have gone far enough heavily depends on
empirical research, and given the fact that such an assertion lends itself to
empirical inquiries, the preponderance of theoretical papers and absence of
empirical research do not help the book to drive these assertions home. Indeed,
including empirical research would have given a more nuanced analysis of the
state of affairs in the global finance and better informed the policy
recommendations of the book.
Although the regulation and governance of global finance is far from perfect
and the urge for betterment is a deeply engrained human desire, perfectionism
may come with huge pitfalls and perils.56 Therefore, the fear of losing the
opportunity of the crisis to launch regulatory reforms should not encourage
regulators to adopt hasty and rushed regulations by suppressing the virtues of
incremental and evolutionary transformations. Instead, regulators should leave
adequate room for local experimentation and ‘‘healthy ventilation of issues that
occurs in the usual give-and-take negotiations over competing policy positions
which works to improve the quality of decision-making”.57 In the absence of
impact assessment studies and data, and facing uncertainty about the potential
impacts of regulatory interventions, the ‘‘do-no-harm principle” should be given
more weight, as it is a common practice in medicine.58
A second difficulty with the suggestion to deepen financial reforms is the
legalistic view of the book to the world of finance and the inclination to fix each
and every problem by legal tools and techniques. This legalistic view tends to
overlook the impact of market forces, private initiatives, technological
advancements and other exogenous factors in mitigating problems arising from
market failures. For example, the book views regulatory arbitrage as a
55 For example, some of the provisions of the Capital Requirements Directive and
Regulation (CRD IV package), such as capital conservation buffer, the countercyclical
buffer and the systemic risk buffer for global systemically important institutions (G-
SIIs), which are largely the implementation of the Basel III capital requirements in the
European Union, will not be fully implemented until 2019. Other provisions such as
liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), net stable funding ratio (NSFR)and leverage ratiowill be
implemented in 2018.
56 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Knud Haakonssen, ed.) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 174.
57 Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance” (2005) 114 Yale LJ 1521 at 1528. In addition, this cycle produces rushed
regulatory reforms in financial markets, and leads to the so-called “quack corporate
governance”. See John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for
Making It Work Better (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2008). For further discussion
of this phenomenon in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
“Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II” (2011) 95 Minnesota
L. Rev. 1779.
58 Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, ‘‘The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial
Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions” (March 2014) IMFWorking Paper WP/14/46.
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potentially harmful phenomenon, however, it seems that in the absence of strong
institutional infrastructure and legal environment such as strong protections for
property and creditor’s rights, lax regulation by itself is not sufficient to give rise
to massive capital flows from heavily regulated to lightly regulated jurisdictions,
because strong prudential regulations ‘‘may serve as a signal of quality and
stability”.59 Indeed, empirical findings emphasize that ‘‘cross-country differences
in regulations have a much more pronounced effect on bank flows if the recipient
country has an advanced economy, strong creditor rights, strong property rights,
and a high degree of information sharing among investors.”60 Therefore,
legalistically-loaded views of the book about the global finance need to be
accompanied by a caveat; equipped with legal knowledge, we might incline to
deal with every problem with legal techniques. In other words, if everything looks
like a nail and in need of pounding, it is perhaps because all we have is a hammer.
In this regard, the dearth of contributions from other disciplines to the book,
such as economics, finance and information technology, which could lead to
crosspollination of diverse views and could potentially result in different policy
recommendation, is markedly pronounced. However, drawing attention to the
impact of factors other than the law and regulation is neither intended to
downplay the role of law in financial stability,61 nor is it an advocacy of
regulatory faineance, but it is a defense of regulatory sobriety, patience, data
dependency, and a deference to the virtues of experimentation and evolutionary
dynamics in the financial system.62
(c) Culture, Professionalism and Ethics in Global Finance
Another overarching theme in the book lies in the suggestion that the world
of finance has witnessed a shift in the values and attitudes of bankers. This
change is particularly highlighted in the shift in the fundamental purpose of
banking from providing a ‘‘social good” to earning profit for its employees and
itself.63 Romanticizing the past, the book bemoans that no longer are banks
incentivized to provide best professional advice to clients and instead they pursue
profits above all.64 The book further goes on recommending the promotion of
peer learning from proud senior practitioners ‘‘(in following the professions of
59 See Joel F. Houston, et al., “Regulatory arbitrage and international bank flows” (2012)
67 Journal of Finance 1845 at 1847.
60 Ibid.
61 For example, Gorton and Metrick concede that there is no pure private sector solution
for ensuring the safety of the banking system and the laws and regulation will play an
essential role in financial stability. See Gary B. Gorton &AndrewMetrick, “Regulating
the Shadow Banking System” (2010) Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 261 at 289.
62 Simon A. Levin & Andrew W. Lo, “Opinion: A new approach to financial regulation”
(2015) 112 Proceedings of the National Acafdemy of Sciences.
63 Ross P. Buckley, “The Changing Nature of Banking andWhy It Matters” in Buckley et
al., supra note 1 at 13.
64 Ibid. at 20.
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old)” who are willing to share their experience.65 It further recommends
involving regulators in unfair treatment of counterparties and avoiding ‘‘socially
excessive risk taking”, and goes on to such lengths to make recommendations to
regulators to encourage financial institutions to refrain from marketing products
that are not understandable even by most discerning and sophisticated market
participants.66
Regarding these propositions, several observations are in order. First, the
underlying assumption that banks at certain points in the past were catering the
needs of the society and providing social or public goods may not withstand a
closer historical scrutiny. Second, regulatory interventions to curb socially
excessive risk-taking and recommending the prohibition of marketing complex
products even to sophisticated investors would not necessarily lead to greater
social welfare. In addition, determining the optimal amount of risk-taking in
financial markets ex ante would be an impossible task for regulators. Therefore,
involving them in preventing socially excessive risk-taking would require further
inquiries about what the ex ante socially optimal amount of risk-taking in
financial markets is, the answer to which would be harder in practice than in
theory. Third, pursuing self-interest does not necessarily mean compromising
clients’ interests. Indeed, putting self-interest versus clients’ interests at the
opposite sides of a spectrum may amount to a false dichotomy. Therefore, the
presence of conflicts of interest between financial institutions and their clients
should not automatically lead to government intervention. Indeed, as will be
argued, there are clear conflicts of interest in financial institutions for which
market solutions exist and the proverbial ‘‘invisible hand” could resolve certain
conflicts of interest and create socially optimal outcomes.
First, it is not clear to which era in the banking history the book refers during
which banks used to provide social goods. As far as the history of banking and
finance suggests, profit motive has always been the driver of the banking
business.67 Indeed, digging into history in search of evidence of the provision of
public or social goods by banks may turn out to be harder than looking for a
needle in a haystack. Although lamented by almost any intellectual and
ideologue, profit maximization has always been at the heart of any economic
enterprise, and it should not surprise us to see reference to practices such as usury
as ‘‘one of the oldest professions of man”.68 The pervasiveness of the profit
motive was of such an extent that neither Aristotelian condemnation of interest
as ‘‘an unnatural breeding of money by money”69 and the most unnatural of all
65 Brian W. Tang, “Promoting Capital Markets Professionalism: An Emerging Asian
Model” in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 383.
66 Blair, supra note 47 at 452.
67 See Jonathan Barron Baskin & Paul J. Miranti Jr,, A History of Corporate Finance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Tim Parks, Medici Money: Banking,
Metaphysics and Art in Fifteenth-Century Florence (London: Profile Books, 2013).
68 J. L. Berstein, ‘‘Background of a Gray Area in Law: The Checkered Career of Usury“
(1965) 51 A.B.A. J. 846.
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modes of business,70 nor ecclesiastical and Islamic denunciation of interest, usury
and/or Riba could stand in the way of the pursuit of profit in the banking
industry.
In this regard, the dictum of history invariably confirms that civilizations are
best served by the economic stimulus provided by free enterprise and varying
wage and profit of its profit-maximizing economic agents.71 Indeed, the small
isles of ever-threatened communities based on ideological selflessness were
always surrounded by the ‘‘raging individualistic sea”.72 The historical records
illustrate that even the Church itself could not escape the imperatives of
profiteering (religious) entrepreneurs. Innocent III famously — and probably
haplessly — decried that if all usurers are to be excluded from the Church, all
churches might be closed.73 Therefore, the records of history show that far from
being Benedictine monasteries, financial markets are more akin to a Darwinian
jungle in which participants are driven by the instinct for self-preservation and
the innate urge to keep up with the Joneses, even if that would amount to
exploiting their peers,74 or socializing risks and privatizing profits.
In an age of technological advancement and pervasiveness of momentum and
high-frequency traders in the global trade and finance, the race to profit from the
tiniest bits and pieces of inefficacies has become very much vigorous by a quest to
extract the smallest pieces of profit opportunities and in the meantime (and
unintentionally) contribute to the formation of more efficient and arbitrage-free
markets.75 Although the recent surge in the provision of socially responsible
modes of financing — and particularly provision of microfinance to financially
underserved communities — might contradict this assertion,76 subsequent
scandals and mission drifts in microfinance showed that the requisites of the
marketplace and profit motives wielded their heavy weight on the supposedly
benign intentions of the early micro-financiers.77
69 William J. Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World (New York:
Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008).
70 Aristotle,Politics (Cambridge:Hackett PublishingCompany, 1998), Book I. The proper
limits of household management: The Unnaturalness of Money Lending.




74 Charles W. Calomiris, “Is deposit insurance necessary? A historical perspective” (1990)
50 Journal of EconomicHistory 283 at 286-287. (Showing how in the antebellumAmerica
adverse selection and moral hazard coupled with instances of fraud and unsound
banking practices led to the failure of several deposit insurance schemes).
75 MichaelLewis,FlashBoys:AWall StreetRevolt (NewYork:W.W.Norton&Company,
2014).
76 MuhammadYunus,Creating aWorld without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of
Capitalism (New York: Public Affairs, 2007).
77 GaamaaHishigsuren, “EvaluatingMissionDrift inMicrofinance Lessons for Programs
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Second, policy proposals to prevent marketing of financial products even to
the most sophisticated financial market participants, can hardly be justifiable.
This proposal indeed runs counter to the basic assumptions on which the
financial markets are built. Although there might be a case for regulatory
intervention to prevent companies and sophisticated individuals from selling
pieces of the blue sky to unsuspecting investors,78 extending such regulatory
protections to sophisticated investors at best leads to a misallocation of
regulatory resources and at worst to encouraging reckless behaviour by
professional investors. Even turning a blind eye on the experimental studies
suggesting that in certain market settings more information can hurt and better
informed agents may suffer losses,79 discouraging the sale and marketing of
complex financial products — whose information is difficult to process — to
professional investors would result in discouraging financial innovation, less
efficient financial markets, or perhaps will be tantamount to closing down the
markets for complex products.
In addition, the underlying assumption for putting forward such proposals
seems to be the belief in and reliance on the supremacy of the knowledge of
financial regulators over that of the financial market participants. It is not clear if
the most sophisticated and discerning financial market participants, who have
their skin in the game, are not able to assess the riskiness of a product, how
government regulators, lacking strong incentives and not having very much at
stake, would be trusted with the discretion to assess which product is not suitable
for which sophisticated investor. Therefore, it is not obvious if a sophisticated
and professional investor is not able to assess the riskiness of financial products,
how regulators would be able to assess their riskiness and suitability for
sophisticated market participants. The bottom line in such a proposal is to
eliminate complex financial products and markets altogether, for if they cannot
be marketed to sophisticated investors, who else would dare purchasing those
products?
Viewed from a slightly different perspective, this proposal seems to be a
stronger version of regulatory paternalism which goes as far as protecting
sophisticated investors and counterparties — the kind of market participants
that might ultimately turn out to be more sophisticated than regulators — from
themselves. Not only hard paternalism, but also its softer forms such as the idea
of nudging80 — a soft form of libertarian paternalism based on the recognition
that there are rampant cognitive biases in human behaviour81 — are criticized on
With Social Mission” (2007) 31 Evaluation Review 203; David Hulme & Mathilde
Maitrot, “Has microfinance lost its moral compass?” (2014) online: SSRN <https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2560331>.
78 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
79 ColinCamerer, et al., “TheCurse ofKnowledge in Economic Settings: AnExperimental
Analysis” (1989) 97 Journal of Political Economy 1232. See also Vernon L. Smith,
“Economics in the Laboratory” (1994) 8 Journal of Economic Perspectives 113 at 119.
80 For a detailed treatment of the concept of nudge, see Richard H. Thaler & Cass R.
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the account that such paternalism would reduce an individual’s incentives to
learn from his/her mistakes and failures, and ultimately to de-bias him/herself.
Indeed, government regulation of irrational human tendencies may exacerbate
the problem by allowing the suboptimal behaviour to survive and prosper.82
In addition, a stream of literature, pioneered by Vernon Smith, underlines
the ‘‘unconscious optimization in market interactions”.83 In this view, ‘‘markets
may induce greater ‘‘rationality” in behaviour, because they force or promote a
response to, or discovery of, opportunity cost conditions, that need not be
readily forthcoming when agents merely think about the choices they make.”84
Therefore, in many experimental market settings, interactions of ‘‘poorly
informed, error-prone, and uncomprehending human agents” according to the
trading rules result in outcomes which are close approximations of the wealth
maximizing models expected only from completely informed and cognitively
rational market participants.85 In other words, in this view of the market,
paradoxically enough, individual irrationality may lead to or enhance collective
rationality.86 In sum, given that individuals make systematic mistakes, in the
aggregate, those mistakes tend to cancel each other out in market interactions.
Third, highlighting the misaligned incentives, it seems that the book implies
that there is a dilemma in providing the best professional advice and pursuing
profits.87 The question is whether there exists a tradeoff between providing the
best advice to clients and pursuing profit, or whether this is simply a false
dichotomy? If there is a tradeoff, are markets able to realign the misaligned
incentives? And if not, what regulatory responses are in order?
Questioning the underlying dichotomy and policy proposals of the book does
not mean that financial markets are free from conflicts of interests. Where there
are agency problems and information asymmetry, conflicts of interests will
inevitably be present. Given the credence goods nature of financial products and
services88 and intertemporal nature of financial transactions, which give rise to
Sunstein,Nudge: ImprovingDecisions aboutHealth,Wealth, andHappiness (NewHaven:
Yale University Press, 2008).
81 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky have studied the systemic human cognitive biases.
See Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (NewYork: Farrar, Straus andGiroux,
2011).
82 Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, “Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral
and Cognitive Hazards” (2006) 90 Minnesota L. Rev. 1620 at 1604.
83 Vernon L. Smith, “Economics in the Laboratory” (1994) 8 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 113 at 118 [Smith] .
84 Vernon L. Smith, “Experimental Economics: Reply” (1985) 75 American Economic
Review 264 at 267.
85 Smith, supra note 83 at 118.
86 Camerer, et al., supra note 78 at 1233.
87 Ross P. Buckley, “The Changing Nature of Banking andWhy It Matters” in Buckley et
al., supra note 1 at 20.
88 For the concept of credence goods, see Philip Nelson, “Information and Consumer
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higher levels of information asymmetry and uncertainty, these conflicts of
interests play a more ominous role in financial markets. But it does not
automatically follow that regulation is needed to address these conflicts of
interests. For example, in the context of underwriting by universal banks vis-a`-
vis investment banks, there is evidence that market forces and private-law
institutions governing the relationships between principals and agents can
significantly reduce the scope of opportunistic behaviour.89 For example,
universal banking, which combines commercial and investment banking in one
entity, is traditionally thought to be fraught with conflicts of interests and open
to opportunistic behaviour. Indeed, one of the underlying reasons for the
enactment of laws separating commercial banking from investment banking in
the wake of the Great Depression (the Glass-Steagall Act) was the opportunistic
behaviour created by the existence of conflicts of interests.90 The recent surge of
interest in adopting structural laws around the world is partly driven by the
concerns regarding conflicts of interest embedded in mixing commercial banking
and proprietary trading on the one hand, and conflicts of interests present in the
relationship of banks, private funds and other bank clients on the other hand.91
As an example of a conflict of interest in universal banking, an underwriter
may have an underlying lending relationship with the issuer prior to the
underwriting relationship.92 In this setting, conflicts of interest arise from the fact
that a commercial bank may inflate the debt issuer’s quality in underwriting its
securities and use the proceeds of underwriting to retire its existing loans to the
same borrower. In other words, by underwriting securities that the universal
bank itself knows are of questionable value, and by requiring the firm to use the
proceeds from the issue to pay off the loan to the underwriting universal bank,
the bank may serve itself at the expense of outside investors in the newly issued
securities.93
Behavior” (1970) 78 Journal of Political Economy 311. For why financial products are
considered as credence goods, see Heremans Dirk, “Regulation of Banking and
Financial Markets” in Roger J. Van den Bergh & Alessio M. Pacces, eds., Encyclopedia
of Law and Economics, vol. 9 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011) at 9-10.
89 Amar Gande, “Commercial Banks in Investment Banking” in Anjan V. Thakor &
Arnoud W.A. Boot, eds., Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking (Amstre-
dam: North-Holland, 2008) [Gande].
90 Georg J. Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking: The Glass-
Steagall Act Revisited and Reconsidered (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 4
[Benston] 3-47.
91 SeeLeonardoGambacorta&AdrianVanRixtel, “Structural bank regulation initiatives:
approaches and implications” (2013) BIS Working Paper No. 412 at 2.
92 Formore on conflicts of interests in the universal bankingmodel, seeBenston, supranote
90. (Discusses a variety of conflicts of interest in the universal banking model).
93 Anthony Saunders, “Conflicts of interest: An Economic View” in Ingo Walter, ed.,
Deregulating Wall Street (New York: Wiley, 1985). See also Benston, supra note 89.
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The second issue regarding combining commercial and investment banking is
the existence of lock-in effects. Universal banks may be tempted to extract
monopoly profits or rents from the information accumulated over the life of the
lending relationship. Since the existing relationship between the costumers and
the universal bank (lending relationship) creates information about the
borrowers to which only the lending institution has access, the universal bank
can outcompete other underwriters because of its informational advantage.94 In
other words, outside underwriters trying to compete with the lending bank, who
does the underwriting, may face a winner’s curse problem.95
However, empirical evidence suggests that market forces can successfully
address concerns about conflicts of interest in this setting.96 These studies have
found substantial evidence that universal banks, which combine investment
banking with commercial banking, did not exploit such conflicts of interest.97 In
other words, the innate urges of market participants do not automatically lead to
beggar-thy-neighbor strategies. Therefore, as the book concedes, at some point,
‘‘reputational sanctions may be real.”98 Here the insights from Vernon Smith
implying that ‘‘to do good for others, does not require deliberate action to
further the perceived interest of others”99 comes into play again. Namely, it is not
necessary to impose a legal obligation on banks to require them to make
deliberate efforts to serve their clients’ interests. Indeed, market interactions and
processes help economic agents to achieve efficient outcomes which are not
primarily intended by market participants.100 The same logic applies to the
banking sector, the pursuit of profit by bankers does not literally translate into
trampling on clients’ interests. On the contrary, profit motive may require banks
to serve its clients’ interests as best as they can.
Although government interventions may result in lesser degrees of conflicts
of interest in certain situations, paradoxically, such interventions and their
distortionary impact may lead to heightened conflicts of interest and market
94 See StevenA. Sharpe, “Asymmetric Information, BankLending and Implicit Contracts:
A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships” (1990) 45 Journal of Finance 1069;
Christopher James, “Relationship-Specific Assets and the Pricing of Underwriter
Services” (1992) 47 Journal of Finance 1865; Raghuram G. Rajan, “Insiders and
Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s-Length Debt” (1992) 47 Journal of
Finance 1367.
95 Ibid.
96 For an excellent literature review, see Gande, supra note 89.
97 Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, “Is the Glass—Steagall Act Justified? A
Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933” (1994) 84 American
Economic Review 810. See alsoManju Puri, “Commercial Banks in Investment Banking
Conflict of Interest or CertificationRole?” 40 (1996) Journal of Financial Economics 373.
98 Blair, supra note 47 at 451.
99 Vernon L. Smith, “Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics” (2003) 93
American Economic Review 465 at 466. (Smith himself borrows this idea from the 18th-
century Scottish philosophers).
100 Smith, supra note 83 at 118.
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imperfections, and ultimately increase the distortions in the market.101 In other
words, along with market imperfections that may give rise to the profit motive to
run amok, government intervention can be equally counterproductive. For
example, it is illustrated that how control over access to data by financial
institutions and especially government-sponsored enterprises, may lead to a
capture of academics by institutions such as Fannie Mae.102 Sometimes,
however, the capture is not just motivated by money. Instead, regulators’
mindset is captured by those whom they regulate, a phenomenon dubbed
‘‘cognitive capture”.103 In addition, despite benign intentions, sometimes
bootleggers may join forces with Baptists to distort public policy to their
advantage, enact laws which may seem benign at first blush, but in essence cater
for the needs of special interest groups.104 The Glass-Steagall Act, being the
result of lobbying by investment banks to keep commercial banks at bay, is a
case in point.105 The collapse of underwriting spreads for both equity and debt
underwritings following the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed
commercial banks to enter into the securities-underwriting business and made
underwriting markets more competitive, seems to confirm the public-choice
account of the enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act.106 To recapitulate, regulatory
intervention is not the only tool to realign the misaligned interests in financial
markets, there is also a role, and credit, to be given to markets and private law
institutions.
(d) Unaddressed Opposing Views and Overlooked Areas of Global Finance
The book takes an agnostic position on certain unresolved and controversial
issues on which different contributors have taken different positions.
Encountering conflicting views on important matters of theory and policy, the
reader would expect to see editorial resolve to opine on such issues. For example,
there are conflicting views in the definitions of ‘‘shadow banking” in China in
two consecutive chapters; one claiming that the definition of shadow banks in
China is significantly different from that of the FSB,107 while the other paper
views the Chinese definition similar to the FSB’s definition.108 The second
101 Zingales, supra note 27 at 19-21.
102 Ibid.
103 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers our
Future (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012).
104 Bruce Yandle, “Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect” (1999) 22 Regulation American
Enterprise Institute 5.
105 JonathanR.Macey, “Special InterestGroupsLegislation and the Judicial Function:The
Dilemma of Glass-Steagall” (1984) 33 Emory L.J. 1.
106 AlanD.Morrison&WilliamWilhelm Jr., Investment Banking: Institutions, Politics, and
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 24-25.
107 Tang, supra note 47 at 327.
108 Huang, supra note 45 at 341.
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example of such opposing views seems to be on the role of law and legal
institutions and whether they matter. In different contexts, the authors reach
different conclusions. For example, Licht finds that evidence for legal bonding
theory is limited,109 while Zetzsche believes that ‘‘law and regulation do shape
financial sector development”,110 and the study of safe assets is entirely based on
highlighting the role and importance of law in giving shape to safe assets.111
There is no scarcity of literature on the importance of law and legal institutions
to economic performance, growth and development.112 In law and finance
literature,113 the legal-origins thesis, which demarcates a distinctive line between
common law countries and civil law countries,114 and the nascent literature on
the legal theory of finance,115 all agree on the role of law in shaping financial
markets, transactions and institutions. The above-mentioned conflicting views
could have been clarified and opined on by the editors in order to save the reader
from further intellectual meanderings.
The book could also have been enriched by opening up some extra room for
new topical issues in global finance and its regulation. These overlooked areas
would potentially include the role of financial technology in deepening the
integration of the global finance, and the rise of digital currencies — particularly
their underlying technologies — and the accompanying opportunities (e.g. the
use of blockchain technology by central bankers),116 and challenges (e.g. the
potential threat they pose to central bankers’ and regulators’ role in monetary
policy and detecting financial crimes). Further enriching topics would include the
study of the role of law and global financial regulation in alleviating certain
thorny problems of global finance, such as addressing potential challenges posed
by climate change, the role of law in democratization of banking and finance,
and financial inclusion.117 And last but definitely not the least, among the issues
109 Amir N. Licht, “Liability for Transnational Securities Fraud” in Buckley et al., supra
note 1 at 263.
110 Dirk A. Zetzsche, “Competitiveness of Financial Centers in Light of Financial and Tax
Law Equivalence Requirements” in Buckley et al., supra note 1 at 391.
111 AnnaGelpern&ErikF.Gerding, “Rethinking theLaw in ’SafeAssets’” inBuckley et al.,
supra note 1.
112 See Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
113 Rafael LaPorta, et al., “LawandFinance” (1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy 1113.
114 Ibid.; Rafael La Porta, et al., “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins” (2008) 46
Journal of Economic Literature 285. The doctrine of legal origins is criticized for the
shortcomings in its empiricalmethods, see e.g., JonathanKlick, “The Perils of Empirical
Work on Institutions: Comment” (2010) 166 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics/ Zeitschrift fu¨r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 166.
115 Pistor, supra note 2.
116 Max Raskin & David Yermack, ‘‘Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the
Future of Central Banking“ (2016) NBERWorking Paper No. 22238.
117 Robert J. Shiller, Finance and the Good Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
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to which less attention is paid are the emerging phenomena, which threaten to
de-globalize finance and unravel the financial integration worldwide and to lead
to global financial disintegration. Examples would include, the risks of
heightened interconnectedness, and the downsides of unilateral financial
sanctions and extraterritorial application of financial laws.118 Covering such
issues would have contributed to the fast-changing world of global finance and
its regulation and would have addressed the ubiquitous criticism that the law lags
behind the ever-increasing speed of global finance.
4. CONCLUSION
The book is a collection of essays from highly-renowned experts in the field
of financial regulation, and despite its peaks and troughs, is a result of
painstaking efforts by distinguished scholars to shed some light on critical
aspects of global finance and to offer policy choices to improve the current
dismal state of affairs in regulation and governance of global finance. This book
will indeed benefit the academics working in the field of finance, financial
regulation, and international financial law and regulation. It will also be
appealing to practitioners as well as financial regulators and policymakers
concerned with the current trends in global financial regulation.
Although not all readers may agree with certain major themes of the book,
(e.g. the depth and reach of the post-crisis regulatory reforms and advocacy of
more regulatory centralization and consolidation), its intuitions, insights and
contributions to the literature on international financial regulation are
indisputable. This is particularly outstanding where the book highlights the
role of law in giving shape to safe assets, the role of market participants in
shaping financial infrastructure, the role of often-overlooked global financial
regulatory networks in regulating global finance, and the increasing role of
central banks in prudential supervision and its interplay with central bank
independence in monetary policy.
However, regarding the evaluation of current regulatory measures, given that
a considerable number of proposed and adopted post-crisis financial regulatory
reforms has yet to be implemented, a grain of patience would be necessary to
assess the potential impacts of strong stream of regulations adopted in the post-
crisis era. In addition, a need for more coordination among regulators does not
necessarily imply that we need to move toward a unitary and centralized model
of global governance and regulation. Instead, mitigating potential risks of gaps
in the regulation of global finance may require a shift of focus from regulatory
harmonization and consolidation to the quality of regulation within each and
every individual regulatory regime encapsulated in the globally fragmented
regulatory systems. With a tunnel vision towards centralization at the global
level, one would be reasonably wary of the dreary prospects of a great credit and
118 Kern Alexander, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009).
BOOK REVIEWS 601
liquidity famine as a result of a ‘‘Great Leap Forward” in the governance of the
global finance toward centralization.
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